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Anglophone Marxism has very largely taken a disappointingly 
unproductive ‘orthodox’ position on Kant’s aesthetics and as a result 
has cut itself off from or disavowed its genealogical relationship to an 
important philosophical resource. Of course there is a basis to the 
interpretation of Kant as a bourgeois philosopher, something that 
Kantian Marxism, from Goldmann, through to Colletti and Karatani, 
tends to deny.  This bourgeois dimension to Kant’s philosophical 
architecture may be discerned in its class conditioned formalism, 
dualism and elitism, while contemporary bourgeois criticism is 
constitutionally unable to interrogate the historical and class 
conditioned nature of Kant’s work or its own interpretations. Yet the 
bourgeois Kant is radically unstable, and an anti-bourgeois Kant is 
just as readily discernable within the third Critique. 1 This Kant can 
offer us a non-reductive philosophy of the aesthetic and its relations 
with social interests, especially class interests. This must sound 
paradoxical. After all, Kant is the author of these lines: ‘Everyone has 
to admit that if a judgment about beauty is mingled with the least 
interest then it is very partial and not a pure judgment of taste’. 2 
                                                        
1 The Critique of Pure Reason investigates the principles by which we can 
objectively know the world. The Critique of Practical Reason investigates the 
principles by which we can act morally in the world. The Critique of Judgment, 
investigates the principles by which we can respond in the register of the 
aesthetic, to the world.  
2  Immanuel Kant Critique of Judgment, Translated by Werner S. Pluhar, Hackett 
Publishing Company, Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1987, p.46.  
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Perhaps the most difficult aspect of Kant’s philosophy for a Marxist 
re-construction of it that would release Kant from his entombment as 
a bourgeois philosopher, is his claim that a pure aesthetic judgment 
is not only non-conceptual, but also, because of that independence 
from instrumental cognition, ‘disinterested’. Precisely what that 
means is however more open to interpretation than has been readily 
acknowledged. The Kant I am excavating here will be clarified by and 
differentiated from two contemporary theorists who take very 
opposing positions on Kant’s aesthetic philosophy: Pierre Bourdieu 
and Jacques Jacques Ranciére.  For Bourdieu of course Kant is the 
foundation of class discrimination in the field of taste and further, 
philosophy is one of the most privileged discourses by which the 
intellectual class disavow their own interests.  For Jacques Ranciére 
on the other hand, Kant is an important resource for rethinking the 
politics of aesthetics and both the aesthetic and philosophy are 
mobilized in his work against what he sees as the sociological fixing 
of subjects by the power of discursive classification.  This battle 
between philosophy/aesthetics and the social sciences turns on the 
question of whether practices are identical to their immediate (social, 
institutional, temporal) conditions of existence. In turning to Kant to 
help us avoid some of the problems associated with Bourdieu’s 
position, I will in turn differentiate my reading of Kant from 
Ranciére’s which in relation to the question of class interests, is close 
to conventional bourgeois interpretations of the Kantian aesthetic.  
The Kant that I am trying to exhume is unrecognized by orthodox 





Not The Bourgeois Kant 
 
Kant defines ‘interest’ as ‘the liking we connect with the presentation 
of an object’s existence’. 3 An interested liking admits factors that are 
extraneous to the pure aesthetic judgment. Those factors concern the 
subject’s non-aesthetic judgments – namely judgments that pertain 
to the existence of the object and the subject’s attitudinal relationship 
to its existence. In response to the aesthetic dimension of a Palace, 
one might prefer ‘nothing better in Paris than the eating-houses’ or 
one might, Rousseau-like condemn the Palace as an object of  vanity 
that expended ‘the people’s sweat’. But says Kant this ‘is not to the 
point’. 4For Kant, a judgment of taste is to be differentiated from the 
agreeable (the pleasures of the belly) or reason (Rousseau-like 
indignation), because it is disinterested. Where as the purely 
sensuous and purely moral/political both are shaped by interests, the 
aesthetic, Kant seems to be suggest, is not. The agreeable, because it 
is grounded only in the sensuous carries a liking that is ‘conditioned 
pathologically by stimuli’. 5  The merely sensuous is thus un-free, 
because of this pathological response to stimulation. ‘Only when their 
need has been satisfied’ states Kant in materialist terms any 
historical materialist could agree with, ‘can we tell who in a 
multitude of people has taste’. 6 The Good is free in one sense insofar 
as we must choose to recognize our moral duties. But it is un-free 
                                                        
3  Kant, ibid,   p.45. 
4 Kant, ibid, pp.45-6. 
5 Kant, ibid, p.51. 
6 Kant, ibid, p.52. 
6 Kant, ibid, p.52. 
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insofar as we really ought to act on those duties. ‘[W]here the moral 
law speaks we are objectively no longer free to select what we must 
do’ Kant argues. 6  Duties are non-negotiable categorical imperatives 
to treat others as ends in themselves and not means to our ends. In 
this sense the Good is rational and interested, while the agreeable is 
merely sensuous and interested. Notice here how Kant’s 
understanding of interest is closely associated with compulsion. We 
might then say that the agreeable is associated with immediate 
sensuous need and its satisfaction (economic scarcity) while the 
moral-political judgment is associated with the compulsion of what 
we ought to do.  Thus Kant says: 
 
Neither an object of inclination, nor one that a law of 
reason enjoins on us as an object of desire, leaves us the 
freedom to make an object of pleasure for ourselves out of 
something or other. 7  
 
Now, once we have recast the concept of interest as meaning 
something like compulsion, the following classic (and bourgeois) 
definition of the aesthetic becomes open to another kind of reading. 
 
Taste is the ability to judge an object, or a way of 
presenting it, by means of a liking or disliking devoid of 
interest. 8  
 
                                                        
7 IKant, ibid, p.52. 
8 Kant, ibid,  p.53. 
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Interest, now read as compulsion, recasts the aesthetic as relatively 
autonomous to need and politics. In terms of need the aesthetic 
operates at that level that is created by any (historically specific and 
developed) surplus; after we eat and satisfy our other vital 
reproductive needs (the merely agreeable) we may engage in the 
aesthetic in which sensuousness is enlarged and acquires a 
complexity through a formal arrangement that is appropriate to a 
society that has accumulated material and cultural surpluses. But it is 
also the place where the compulsions of the moral (read political) 
universe to defend and obey conceptions of the Good (the 
distribution and order of the sensuous) now become mediated by 
sensuous play and inter-subjective debate.  The Rousseau-like 
response to the Palace must now subject itself to the specificity of the 
aesthetic play of forms which complicate and mediate the political 
condemnation of the immediate conditions and motives for building 
the palace.  Judgment may now for example discern some utopian 
impulses for a generalisation of the very surplus which is the 
condition of the aesthetic in the first place. Thus the aesthetic 
operates in a new (for Kant) space, a space that was also historically 
(re)emerging in Europe but which had been absent since the times of 
the ancient Greeks. This space is one where sense without need and 
reason without a priori moral command can come together in a new 
configuration. The aesthetic opens up a space for reflecting on 
interests (compulsions) precisely because it is not a direct reflection 
of interests (compulsions).  
 
Now, the aesthetic, as a space where the compulsion of need 
(economics) and politics (the struggle over the legitimacy of the 
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economic order) is slackened off means that the aesthetic is a 
practice where commonality and difference can be explored in ways 
that the more immediate imperatives of class and politics make 
difficult. The agreeable is a judgment wallowing in the ‘private 
conditions’ of the merely sensuous being. It has little or no social 
dimension about it given the structure of bourgeois civil society, 
while the beautiful for Kant is a code word for thinking about a more 
authentic social being than either the determinism of nature/civil 
society or the moral-political command articulates. Only the liking of 
the beautiful is ‘disinterested and free, since we are not compelled to 
give our approval by any interest, whether of sense or of reason.’ 9 
Disinterestedness opens up a social being that is inter-subjective and 
based on communication. ‘Aesthetic disinterestedness has broadened 
interest beyond particularity’ argued Adorno in similar fashion with 
one eye obliquely on the third Critique. 10 The aesthetic implies ‘a 
relation between interest and its renunciation’ and this means that 
the aesthetic may function as a critique of ‘the rule of brutal self-
preservation at the heart of the status quo and in its service’. 11 
 
Interpreting Kant’s aesthetic philosophy as a struggle against 
reification, rather than as a transcendence of the social, shifts it away 
from bourgeois apologetics and towards an exploration of the 
transcendental conditions of intersubjectivity where something 
analogous to (but different from) the moral good could emerge 
through a process of discussion, debate and dialogue.  We accord the 
aesthetic judgment a certain universal validity as if it were a logical 
                                                        
9 Kant, ibid,  p.52. 
10 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, Continuum, London 1997, p.14. 
11 Adorno, ibid. 
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objective judgment, when in fact it is merely a subjective one, but one 
which escapes private and individualistic subjectivity. It is ‘as if’ the 
aesthetic judgment is a universal judgment (it is made as if it were 
objective) but it is ‘as if’ it is not a universal judgment (it is a 
judgment which others can and do disagree with and it operates 
outside natural scientific type proofs). The as if principle here 
becomes not disavowal but instead activates the Kantian critical 
procedure of the parallax, as outlined by Kojin Karatani. 12  The 
alternation between an antithesis (universality and subjectivity) 
means that something unlike the logical universal might emerge in 
the oscillation.  That something is clearly the social. It is this opening 
up to the social dimensions of being which the bourgeois 
interpretation of Kant’s aesthetics has largely repressed. 
 
Taste, Kant argues cultivates our ‘sociability’. 13 In this it struggles to 
release us from the prison of egotistical judgment. Our sensus 
communis, our universal and shared powers to reflectively judge, 
allows us:  
 
as it were to compare our own judgment with human 
reason in general and thus escape the illusion that arises 
from the ease of mistaking subjective and private 
conditions for objective ones, an illusion that would have 
a prejudicial influence on judgment’ 14  
 
                                                        
12 Kojin Karatani Transcritique on Kant and Marx, MIT Press, Cambridge 
Massachuesetts, 2005,pp.47-50. 
13 Kant Critique of Judgment, Indianapolis/Cambridge, p.163. 
14 Kant, ibid, p.160. 
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This notion that private conditions (and interests) have a prejudicial 
influence on our judgments makes Kant a rather anti-bourgeois 
‘bourgeois’ philosopher. In what Kant called the reflective judgment, 
where the universal is suspended, we may override ‘the private 
subjective conditions of…judgment, into which so many others are 
locked’ 15 and reflect on our own judgment ‘from a universal 
standpoint’ which we can do only  ‘by transferring…[ourselves] to the 
standpoint of others)’. 16  This universal is not the logical universal 
that is given from the first Critique. It is at once subjective, dialogical 
and a utopian/potential universal 17 in the claim that it makes.   
 
The movement from individual interest to some more universal 
interest is key, but in the first instance, the individual interest is 
merged with the general interests of a group or class. Thus the 
individual may be seen as a member of a genus or community (as in 
taxonomic classifications), a individual-general connection or circuit 
that is distinct from universality as such. Real universality would 
thus require an acknowledgment of the standpoint of others across 
substantive (and unequal) differences. Thus, and this is crucial, if the 
aesthetic is associated with an emerging sense of the social, it is also 
associated with an emerging sense of the failure of the social, the 
social as fractured by (class) division. Karatani’s reading of Kant is 
helpful here. He is interested in the idea that inter-discourse across 
communities (generalities) represents the transcritical move (the 
parallax) from which we can perhaps glimpse the universal, which is 
                                                        
15 Kant, ibid, p.161. 
16 Kant, ibid. 
17 Kant, ibid, p.89. 
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characterized in the reflective judgment by the fact that it is not 
given. 
 
Kant drew a keen distinction between universality and 
generality…While generality can be abstracted from 
experience, universality cannot be attained if not for a 
certain leap….the condition for a certain cognition to be 
universal is not necessarily that it be based on a priori 
rule, but that it be exposed to the judgment of others who 
follow a different set of rules. 18  
 
Universality emerges, or perhaps better, is glimpsed instead in a 
complex communication act across communities ‘who follow a 
different set of rules’ and it is the singular judgment which the 
aesthetic experience may prompt in the individual (ordinarily sunk 
in their membership of a particular community or group) that 
provides a route to a provisional universality. For Kant the aesthetic 
is the privileged nexus point between the non-logical universal and 
the singular. 19 This ‘universal’ is best thought of in its aesthetic 
construction as a transient glimpse of structural conditions and 
interrelationships. In the aesthetic, the certain leap is achieved by the 
complexity of its communicative form across difference. Thus class-
consciousness always requires the emergence of a consciousness of 
other classes, since classes by definition exist in relationships to one 
another. And emergence into consciousness of others at any level, 
                                                        
18 Kojin Karatani Transcritique on Kant and Marx, Cambridge Massachusetts, 
2005,p.100 
19 Kant, op.cit., p.144. 
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including classed others, opens up the possibility (but not the 
guarantee) of reflective powers in the aesthetic mode where  
immediate class interests can be temporally bracketed as direct 
imperatives and ‘the standpoint of others’ suddenly impinges into 
consciousness of the self in ways that are interesting, exploratory, 
critical and even anticipatory of changes implied by the un-
sustainability of those class relations. 
 
 
Bourdieu: Against the Aesthetic 
 
The war between philosophy – which accuses the social sciences of a 
reductionist fixing of what it studies – and the social sciences, which 
accuses philosophy of a lack of social and historical specificity, has 
been particularly fierce around the work of Pierre Bourdieu. 
Bourdieu’s hostility towards philosophy, whose concepts are  ‘half-
baked, although well done enough to arouse delicious shudders of a 
bogus revolution'  is matched only by his fierce critique of aesthetics. 
20  Bourdieu’s sociology of culture provides both the theoretical tools 
and masses of empirical data, albeit specific to the French national 
context, for understanding some of the conditions of cultural 
production and reception and the class stratified nature of those 
conditions. At the same time, a philosophy of the aesthetic 
understands that the aesthetic is not identical with its immediate 
conditions of existence and that the historical and the social is 
                                                        
20 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Historical Genesis of a Pure Aesthetic’ The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 46, 1987, p.201. 
 11 
operative at levels of abstraction which a more empirical sociology of 
culture often misses.  
 
Bourdieu’s critique of aesthetics begins conceptually by reminding it 
of its social conditions of possibility.  His important concept of the 
habitus is the means by which he seeks to navigate his way between 
the twin traditions of the social sciences: objectivism and 
subjectivism, whose opposition has failed to integrate their 
respective truths into a single system. The habitus internalizes and 
orientates the subject to their objective environment providing 
‘schemes of perception, thought, and action’ that guides their 
practices and their representations. 21 Despite his anti-Kantianism, 
Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus owes something to the first 
Critique, with its emphasis on the mental structures that allow 
cognitive mapping of the world. Of course, Bourdieu is not 
constructing a universal transcendental subject, but rather a 
differentiated, social and historically determined transcendental 
(that is determinate) subject. Bourdieu seeks to bring structures and 
the representations which social actors bring to their daily 
negotiation of their structures into some sort of dynamic 
relationship. The different habitus that differentially classed subjects 
develop mobilises the attitudinal dispositions and competences that 
are available to them according to the social space that they occupy. 
As the competences and dispositions that are acquired ‘tend to be 
adjusted to position’ in social space, social agents ‘even the most 
disadvantaged ones, tend to perceive the world as natural and to 
                                                        
21 Pierre Bourdieu ‘Social Space and Symbolic Power’ Sociological Theory, No.1 
1989, p.14. 
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accept it much more readily than one might imagine’.22 The habitus 
which agents have is shaped by the position which they occupy in 
social space and it in turn produces practices within that space 
which, within Bourdieu’s conceptual architecture, can be conceived 
as at best, offering the line of least resistance to those conditions. 
Bourdieu tends to concentrate on and assume a ‘quasi-perfect 
coincidence of objective structures and embodied structures’23 and 
has no real basis to theorise under what circumstances that tight fit 
might be fractured. It is true that he allows for a degree of 
‘indeterminancy and fuzziness’ between objective structures and 
perceptual representations, not least because in real history the 
meaning of things ‘are subject to variations in time so that their 
meaning, insofar as it depends on the future, is itself in suspense, in 
waiting, dangling’ .24  But Bordieu’s sense of temporality does not 
rescue him from a  tendential functionalism, not least because 
Bourdieu has a rather ‘sociological’ view of history. The elasticity 
between conditions and the practices they give rise to never really 
causes any fundamental problems or contradictions; it merely allows 
a degree of latitude that gives the system (or field) a historically 
evolving, but stable identity.  
 
The artistic field internalizes the market logic that equates artificial 
(i.e. socially engineered) scarcity with a higher exchange value while 
at the same time developing a language and a field that scorns 
proximity to the commercial, the economic, the ‘vulgar’ world of 
                                                        
22 Pierre Bourdieu, ibid, p.18. 
23 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups’ Theory and  
Society vol.14, no.6, 1985, p731. 
24 Pierre Bourdieu, ibid, p.728 
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routine everyday capitalism and of course above all, to the masses. 
The ‘pure aesthetic’ of the Kantian type is founded on a disavowal of 
its privileged social basis. Typically the competences and dispositions 
for successful entry and navigation of the artistic field that have been 
acquired under exclusive social conditions, appear to the subject as 
the product of personal taste, intelligence and individual brilliance. 
The autonomy of the artistic field, which Bourdieu sees as a product 
of capitalist modernization, is merely the institutional basis of this 
individual perception, writ large. ‘The invention of the pure gaze is 
realized in the very movement of the field toward autonomy’. 25 
Against this autonomization, which is real but also blind to it real 
conditions, Bourdieu insists on the importance of excavating the 
history of the artistic field, by which he means the genealogy of the 
special language and concepts which have been developed in order to 
disavow its economic and social basis. Yet, as with the tight fit 
between objective structures and the practical mastery of those 
structures through the acquired habitus, Bourdieu’s historicisation of 
the field reinforces the sense of its more or less seamless 
reproduction. There is very little in Bourdieu’s work of the social and 
historical world beyond the relatively autonomous field and therefore 
very little sense that the aesthetic is embedded in the tumult of its 
times.  
 
The political economy or sociology of the immediate conditions for 
the aesthetic are always embedded in a wider series of differences 
which disrupt the smooth reproduction of those conditions.  In 
Bourdieu’s work there is little conceptual understanding of a 
                                                        
25 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Historical Genesis of a Pure Aesthetic’ op.cit.,  p.207. 
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communicative relation that involves awareness of difference and 
the inscription of the other inside the field as a disruptive force.  
Aesthetic form is the compressed and compacted inscription of wider 
social relations in the peculiar language of a given medium and its 
multiple genres. And since social relations are never – no matter how 
exclusive the aesthetic in question – just a matter of the internal life 
of a given social group, but are always about a group or a class’s 
relationship with others, those others, even if only ever disavowed, 
are always inscribed as part of the communicative structure of 
aesthetic form. These social differences (of class, race or gender) 
produce the characteristic ‘dialogic’ quality of the aesthetic, as well as 
its internal contradictions and tensions.   
 
From Bunuel’s Un Chien Andalou (1929) to Michael Haneke’s Hidden 
(2005) art cinema has demonstrated that despite its material 
constitution as a cinema of the middle class, by the middle class, it 
inscribes into its very communicative architecture or form, the 
disruptive presence of the other (the unconscious, the classed and 
racial other and so forth). In Haneke’s Hidden, what is hidden is 
above all the invisible omniscient gaze of the camera – the 
disinterested gaze in the classic bourgeois Kantian sense – that tells 
the story but which is periodically unmasked as not so disinterested 
by the integration into the film of the ‘illegitimate’ video surveillance 
of the bourgeois family. Although this illegitimate camera is hidden 
from the family within the story world (and it is this that marks it as 
a source of threat from some interested other), the camera that is 
typically hidden from our consciousness as viewers by the denial of 
its presence and thus the camera which structures our point of entry 
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into the story worlds of mass culture, our navigation of those story 
worlds, our sense of who and what these stories are about, in short 
our focalization, is the institutional camera gaze that normalizes the 
middle class world view. The critique which Hidden directs at the 
erasure of that omniscient camera telling the story, pivots precisely 
on the inscription of the other into the form of the film in the form of 
the hidden video camera. Nor is this just aimed at the media in 
general or popular cinema.  The film is also reflecting on the 
implications of the middle class focalisation that is institutionalised 
by art cinema. Video is the form and the medium by which the 
uncomfortable gaze of some other literally enters the lives of the 
bourgeois family. Video turns the tables and empowers the 
marginalized against those who have access to the means of 
representation. Georges, the central character, is a well-known host 
on a television discussion programme focusing on high culture where 
he is happy to be the object of the official camera-gaze of consecrated 
institutions. 
 
It is precisely this acknowledgment by the film of its institutional, 
social and class limits that counts as an example of reflective 
judgment. The reflective judgment is one which subjectively 
acknowledges that the ‘universal’ is not given,  that it is a fiction or 
ideological construct. This awareness emerges in the painful 
registering of the other in the form of the film, a registering that 
acknowledges the broken lines of communication across the divided 
social terrain. The parallax the film constructs between the gaze of 
the official camera and the gaze of the plebian video camera can do 
no more than glimpse, by negating the current conditions of 
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communication, a more authentic universal condition. Implicitly, to 
do that the film must allude to some utopian standpoint to make its 
critique. Perhaps this is one way of reading the film’s final image – 
that enigmatic meeting between Georges son and Majid’s son, which 
might betoken an overcoming of the divisions that structured the 





Ranciére: The Aesthetic vs the Social Sciences 
 
Bourdieu’s sociology of culture offers us a sobering reminder of the 
classed conditions of possibility for the aesthetic. However 
Bourdieu’s impoverished conceptualization of aesthetic form reduces 
aesthetic practices to their conditions (in this case, the field). By 
contrast, Ranciére’s work offers us a much more suggestive, 
attractive and complex account of what he calls the aesthetic 
experience, that recognizes that practices are not identical to 
immediate conditions. However, Ranciére rescues aesthetic practices 
from their reduction to conditions at the expense of very largely 
bracketing off social and historical conditions entirely. Ranciére’s 
work has very little to say about class and class interests in relation 
to the aesthetic.  
 
Ranciére’s discourse is in a kind of philosophic-mythic mode where 
Plato is his negative touchstone. For Plato prescribes the template of 
contemporary social scientific thought that affirms a ‘relationship of 
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reciprocal confirmation between a condition and a thought’. 26  
Contemporary social scientific discourses fix people in their place, in 
specific spatio-temporal locations and thus reproduce the system of 
power that they are ostensibly trying to critique. Ranciére’s own 
method rationalises itself as a liberation from such academic 
disciplines and his philosophic-mythic discourse is inspired by the 
aesthetic and is conceived as effecting a strategic shift in the 
‘discursive register’ of an object, ‘its universe of reference, or its 
temporal designations’. 27 Socio-historical enquiry thus becomes, for 
Ranciére, the reproduction of a disciplinary prison for both the 
writer and object of that enquiry. In Bourdieu’s deterministic 
sociology for example  ‘an abode must determine a way of being that 
in turn determines a way of thinking’. 28  The social sciences thus 
pacify and ‘establish stable relations between bodily states and the 
modes of perception and signification that corresponds to them’. 29   
 
The division which Ranciére sets up between the political dimension 
of the aesthetic and a social-scientific understanding of it is deeply 
structured into his view. For Ranciére, the utopian power of the 
aesthetic must be conceived in terms that reject ‘the consistency of 
coherent social groups’ 30 since a group is by definition, for him, an 
entity that is already fixed in place and unable to disturb what he 
calls the ‘distribution of the sensible’.  This concept refers in part to  
                                                        
26 Jacques Ranciére, ‘The Aesthetic Dimension: Aesthetics, Politics, Knowledge’, 
Critical Inquiry, Vol. 36.No.1, 2009, p.17. 
27 Jacques Ranciére and Davide Panagia ‘A Conversation with Jacques Ranciére’, 
Diacritics, vol. 30, no.2, 2000, p. 120. 
28 Ranciére, ‘The Aesthetic Dimension’ op.cit.,  p.16. 
29  Ranciére, ibid, p.17. 
30 Jacques Ranciére and Davide Panagia ‘A Conversation with Jacques Ranciére’, 
Diacritics, vol. 30, no.2, 2000,p.124. 
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the divisions of labour that assign sensual beings their place within 
the social order, their visibility and invisibility and the evaluations 
that are put on their visibility and invisibility. Note how this 
dimension of the distribution of the sensible effectively renders into 
philosophical language the kind of sociological commonplace that 
philosophers censure sociologists for making, much to Bourdieu’s 
annoyance. 31  
 
But the other dimension of the distribution of the sensible refers to 
that peculiar (re)distribution of the sensible that is the aesthetic 
experience  and which on Ranciére’s reading of Kant, disrupts the 
socially determined relationship between concept and sense.  
 
The aesthetic experience is the experience of a specific 
sensorium cancelling oppositions of understanding and 
sensibility, form and matter, activity and passivity. 32 
 
The specificity of the aesthetic lies in two contradictory movements – 
one which asserts its autonomy and one which reconnects it with ‘the 
art of living’. The aesthetic experience is linked to both the beautiful 
in art and an engagement with the art of living. The relationship 
between the two is what constitutes the aesthetic experience, which 
is ‘effective inasmuch as it is the experience of that and’. 33 That 
experience can only be embodied in a living subject that comes into 
contact with the aesthetic product. It is the experience itself, not the 
                                                        
31 See Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Historical Genesis of a Pure Aesthetic’ op.cit., p.201. 
32 Jacques Ranciére, ‘The sublime from Lyotard to Schiller, Two Readings of Kant 
and their political significance’ Radical Philosophy, 126, 2004, p.12. 
33 Jacques Ranciére, ‘The Aesthetic Revolution and its Outcomes’ New Left Review 
14, 2002, p.134. 
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‘artwork’ that achieves a degree of autonomy. This autonomy though 
is relative because the aesthetic experience opens up the possibility 
of transferring what is discovered in the contact with the aesthetic 
product, back into life and discharging something of its 
transformational powers into life (although not in any simple cause 
and effect manner).  Here we are reminded of what Kant refers, in the 
third Critique, to the aesthetic power to develop ‘material for the 
understanding which the latter disregarded in its concept’. 34 We only 
have to give Kant a modest accentuation, i.e. that the ‘understanding’ 
disregarded material for reasons pertaining to socially determined 
interests, to make his philosophy useful for critique proper.   
 
Yet Ranciére’s version of the aesthetic experience is indeed in 
important respects, despite its political radicalism, indistinguishable 
from the standard bourgeois reading of Kant. The aesthetic ‘strictly 
identifies art in the singular and frees it from any specific rule, from 
any hierarchy of the arts, subject matter, and genres’. 35  This is a 
common misreading within the bourgeois intelligentsia of Kant’s 
concept of singularity, but Kant very explicitly insists in his 
comments on genius, that the artist works in relation to aesthetic 
constraints. 36  And to Ranciére we must ask: any hierarchy? Any rule?  
What has happened here to the medium, the genre, the technology, 
the institutions, in short the conditions of existence? Rather than 
pose a mediated relation with what exists, which I would suggest is 
posited by Kant in his best moments, we have here a reproduction of 
Kantian compartmentalization. There are rules and hierarchies, and 
                                                        
34 Immanuel Kant Critique of Judgment, Indianapolis/Cambridge, p.185. 
35 Jacques Ranciére, The Politics of Aesthetics, Continuum, London 2007, p.23 
36 Kant, op.cit., p.171. 
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there is that which escapes rules and hierarchies. A simple division. 
This is the nub of the problem. The aesthetic experience is viewed as 
a compartmentalization from not a mediation with life and its 
conditions.  What happens within the aesthetic experience can and 
does cross back over into life (and vice-versa) but in this formulation 
the experience itself is radically non-identical with its wider 
conditions. For Ranciére the beautiful marks a space that is free from 
cognition and desire (either the interested desire of the agreeable or 
the interested desire of the moral Good). This is the basis of the ‘free 
play’ of the faculties for Ranciére. 37  Yet this conception, which can 
be legitimately derived from Kant, is also in contradiction with the 
overall architecture of Kant’s philosophy in the third Critique, since 
the ‘free play’ of the faculties is precisely a play between the 
imagination and the understanding, With cognitive judgments the 
imagination is reproductive, assisting the understanding in its task of 
synthesizing the manifold of experience into intuitions that can be 
stamped with universal concepts. 38 With the aesthetic, the 
imagination appears to be more productive, that is have some 
significant autonomy from the empirical world of the senses as 
evidenced by its play with forms. However the imagination is still in 
play with the understanding. It is never an unconditional freedom. 
Taste is a point of mediation between the empirical and reason. 
 
It is however a fairly unreconstructed bourgeois Kant that Ranciére 
resurrects to underpin the aesthetic experience.  Instead of thinking 
of the aesthetic experience as a reconfiguration of cognition (the 
                                                        
37 Jacques Ranciére, ‘The sublime from Lyotard to Schiller’ op.cit.,  p.9. 
38 Immanuel Kant Critique of Pure Reason, Hackett Publishing Company, 
Cambridge Indianapolis,  1996. 
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understanding) and interest (sensuous desire and the moral desire of 
reason) Ranciére sees the aesthetic as neither cognition nor desire. 
‘The aesthetic state is a pure instance of suspension’.39 What Ranciére 
calls the ‘neutralisation’ of the established distribution of the senses, 
means that he associates the aesthetic with dissensus rather than the 
consensus of the socially sanctioned distribution of the senses. This is 
an interesting proposition and certainly a useful corrective against a 
version of Gramscian cultural criticism that has emphasised the role 
of culture in winning the consent of the dominated to their 
domination. If instead we at least contemplate that the aesthetic, like 
the political, begins with dissensus, begins with the breakdown, the 
gap and disturbance in the social order, it can usefully reorient us 
towards the aesthetic as constituted at least in part by its sensitivity 
towards division and disagreement. However Ranciére very explicitly 
rules out the idea that his concept of dissensus involves conflicting 
interests. To posit dissensus in terms of conflicting interests is for 
him to be still trapped within the terms of the hierarchical 
distribution of the senses that establishes the basis of the conflict in 
the first place. ‘A dissensus is not a conflict… There is a dissensus 
only when the opposition itself is neutralized. 40  
 
This is a very strange kind of dissensus indeed and one that stands 
outside the class struggle as it has been structured by the 
distribution of the senses.  It is surely possible to grant that the 
aesthetic is a site of struggle around ‘sense’ (in both the conceptual 
and sensuous ‘sense’ of that word) which is a continuation of what is 
                                                        
39 Jacques Ranciére, The Politics of Aesthetics, London 2007, p.24. 
 
40 Jacques Ranciére, ‘The Aesthetic Dimension’ op.cit.,  p3. 
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happening in the art of the living, while granting that this struggle 
takes place according to different rules (not the absence of rules) 
from the political domain?  One can begin now to see where the 
tendential rejection of socio-cultural contextualisation and rejection 
of group interest as having a determining relationship to the political 
dimension of the aesthetic, is leading. It leads in short back to a 
rather traditional reading of the Kantian aesthetic as some kind of 
transcendence of social interests, albeit now cast in the terms of a 
radical utopianism of the individual. This is why Ranciére conceives 
the aesthetic effect as one of ‘dis-identification’, where the individual 
achieves withdrawal from their membership of the genus: ‘The 
aesthetic community is a community of dis-identified persons’.41 This 
is why the utopian vision of the ‘aesthetic community’ in Ranciére’s 
vision does not seem to require a confrontation with privilege and 
power. One could argue in a discourse that Ranciére no doubt would 
find old-fashioned, that the political efficacy of the aesthetic resides 
at one level in precisely achieving an identification (suppressed 
within the dominant universe of concepts) with a group existing in 
antagonistic relations with other groups. If there is any ‘dis-
identification’ it is with the inequities of that arrangement, not with 





There is then a bourgeois Kant in the third Critique. We cannot deny 
it. Bourdieu takes this Kant as the model of the ideology of the 
                                                        
41 Jacques Ranciére The Emancipated Spectator, Verso 2011. 
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aesthetic today. But his vision of aesthetic form is desperately 
impoverished, reducing it to strategies of exclusion and playing the 
game for individual/class social advantage. The aesthetic as a 
complex communicative-imaginative structure that has a lightning-
rod capacity to register our social being and its relationships with 
others within broader social contexts has no place in his model. Like 
the aesthetic, philosophy, against which Bourdieu was equally 
opposed, typically and implicitly speaks from a position that is other 
to its immediate conditions of existence and it is this that allows 
Marxist philosophy to insist on the reality of potentialities 
germinating within the present even when all the dominant empirical 
arrangements are so organised as to resist the development of those 
potentialities. Similarly, the utopian dimension is ineliminable as a 
tacit critical standpoint for the aesthetic.  
 
Unlike Bourdieu, Ranciére is alive to this utopian dimension of the 
aesthetic. But what is largely invisible to Ranciére is the possibility of 
a genuinely anti-bourgeois Kant from which to launch a critique of 
the reduction of practices to their conditions.  His suggestive 
concepts of the distribution of the sensible, the aesthetic experience 
and dissensus are problematised by his argument that the aesthetic 
is not a site of mediation that is difficult to realize elsewhere, but a 
pure suspension of the social conditions of existence. By contrast 
Kant writes of the aesthetic as ‘the free lawfulness of the imagination’ 
42 
 
                                                        
42 Kant, op.cit., p.91. 
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Against both Bourdieu and Ranciére I have argued that there is anti-
bourgeois Kant available to us.  Here the aesthetic offers a experience 
of the universal which is inherently provisional, glimpsed in the 
dawning awareness of conflicting interests represented by the 
presence of others.  Awareness of the presence of others is 
constructed in the communicative architecture (form) of the 
aesthetic. As awareness of the other is inscribed in the form of the 
communication itself, so grows the possibility of enlarging our 
capacity for reflective judgment, for judgment to not only reflect its 
material conditions, but for judgment to reflect on its material 
conditions. The capacity for reflective judgment expands as our 
provisional awareness of the social totality is offered in the aesthetic 
experience and it contracts accordingly as our awareness of the other 
from their standpoint recedes from our consciousness. The aesthetic 
is therefore necessary to offer us the possibility of exploration and 
discovery beyond immediate individual interests and immediate 
interests of the class or group which politics defends. It is the 
pressure of social antagonisms that makes aesthetic practices non-
identical with their conditions. Kantian ‘disinterest’ identifies the 
specificity of the aesthetic to be receptive to this in a way that the 
agreeable and moral reason are not. Reflective judgment in the 
aesthetic can be read as an imaginative exploration that takes the 
modes of representation beyond the (class) experience of the 
individual subject, situating both individual and class experience in 
the context of the network or relations that form the ‘whole’ of 
experience that is the essential prerequisite for the ability to reflect 
on and not be simply a reflection of material conditions. Reflection on 
requires coming into a peculiar kind of consciousness raising contact 
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with the (classed) other. This painful consciousness is the open 
wound of the aesthetic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
